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THE YEAR OF PRIDE AND PRAISE
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.*
This is the year for pride and for praise. Gladstone said it was "the most
wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of
man." 1 When one is young, one smiles indulgently at such hyperbole; what
an old windbag that Gladstone was! I got a little older, and one wise day I
asked myself, "Alright, if not the American Constitution, then what is the
most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the human mind and
will?" I'm still asking. I haven't been sleeping with the Constitution at my
bedside; it's just across the room. But I may move it closer, where I can stir
and touch it during the night, just to remind myself, in these of all times, that
fifty-five American people, in about a hundred days, could create such a
thing, without even hurrying.
What was their secret? I'll tell you what I think. I think they could do it
because they thought they could do it. They thought that four or five dozen
people, pretty well-educated, talented, and experienced in politics, could
meet in Philadelphia one summer and draw up a Constitution that would last
a great nation-destined, as they knew, to grow greater-for an indefinite
time. I don't think anybody nowadays would believe in a crazy thing like
that. Think of the inadequacy of the database! Should we not let out a
contract for loading up a computer or two? Feed into it "models," to predict
the functioning of this or that governmental device, as computers predicted
the outcome of the Vietnam war? And how could just fifty-five people give
adequate hearing, not to the few simple though grand interests considered in
the 1787 compromises, but to the desires of every religious sect, every
used-car dealers' association, every ethnic group, every industry clamoring
for subsidy, that would be pounding at the door for a little bit better deal?
Would not either a bowing to the "people's right to know," or inevitable
leakage, make impossible that effective and absolutely vital secrecy in
deliberation that the fifty-five 1787 people maintained? I cannot think that
you could now get together fifty-five people who would believe of them-
selves, or of whom it would be believed by others, that they could do it.
What did they do? They created a flexible but resilient structure, and the
possibility-more, the likelihood-of benign, even vital, developments
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within that structure. in such combination resides the art of constitution-
making.
One ought to beware of judging a constitution by what it settles. It is not
the prime function of a constitution to settle everything-not even every-
thing important-but to provide usable paths toward later wise settlement.
Nor is it often easy to say what expectation, if any, existed, at the opening of
these paths, as to the ends toward which they would be traveled. It may be
that, under the wisest of constitutions, it is hardest to say whether some
grand feature of the government, achieved within the firm constitutional
structure, by the use of its prudent leeways, was foreseen by those who
ordained the structure. Credit for the achievements of our own Constitution
may therefore have to be awarded jointly but indivisibly to those of 1787 and
to the American people since. I rather guess that this would have seemed
obvious to those who, after deliberations secret in their time and largely kept
secret for decades to come, gave out this 6,000 word document, about the
length of one solid academic lecture, for public acceptance, in its own spare
and carefully weighed terms, as that which was to "constitute" the United
States of America.
Let us then consider some wonderful things that have grown in direct
descent from the 1787 text, within its restraints and using its provident
leeways.
The only thinkable start is with the system of states, practically and in
sound theory indestructible, that have been bound into the Union. This
system is the creation of the American people before 1787, in 1787, and in
consequence of 1787. Nothing about this system is surprising except maybe
the facts.
In 1889, Montana was admitted to the Union, becoming thereby entitled to
at least one Congressman, and two Senators, just like New York, and to the
same degree and kind of internal power as was enjoyed by New York-the
latter-named being in 1889 a political unit with an unmistakable identity back
a good deal more than two hundred years, and with an 1889 population about
forty-two times that of Montana. In the United States Senate with its
immense general and special powers, and in all local power appertaining to
the States, these two entities thenceforth stood equal. If Montana got one
Congressman and Delaware-settled by the British in 1664, a signer of the
Declaration of Independence, and the first state to ratify the Constitution-
got two, that would have been strictly because neutral principles of arithme-
tic found the dividing line to lie between their populations, as counted in
1890.
Now these facts may not be surprising. But they certainly are astounding.
I don't think any other country in 1787 (or for that matter in 1889 or now) had
or has any such system so combining simplicity and bold imagination for
consolidating both physical and moral authority over territories and popula-
tions as these vastly expand. You develop as the goal an exact equality of
status with Massachusetts. With some variations in timing, you grant that
equality. There is in this the grandeur of magnanimity, rising far above any
small and temporary concerns.
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The 1787 Constitution pointed the way, empowering Congress to do this.
There was in the Convention some major hesitation: a proposal to put in the
Constitution a rule that the anticipated new western states be treated as
equal in all respects to the old was, I believe, twice defeated, and never
passed. On the other hand, no inequality was constitutionalized. The provi-
sion of article V, that equality of representation in the Senate is to be
shielded from change even by amendment, would have made it a close-
hauled thing to attempt admission of new states, called "states" but not
enjoying this right in full. Probably, too, the affirmative provision of article I
might have made it seem prohibited to call anything a "state" and not accord
it the right to send two Senators, and the number of Congressmen estab-
lished in article I. One could imagine textual quibbles about this, but the 1787
Constitution at least pushed in the direction of full-measured generosity. My
opinion would be that equality in these centrally strategic features must have
reinforced, at least, those impulses toward general equality that did in the
event prevail.
That is what this whole system has exhibited-generosity. There is no
better name for it. The older states made the decision-in the constitutional
passages pushing that way, in the leeway they left, and then in their
actions-not to set up intricate, and for each case specially calculated,
grades of dependency in the lands to the west, but to give a full share in
government, under the same rules as those applying to Virginia, to each of
these communities as it came into being, with only minor and short hesita-
tions, as in the case of Utah-and, of course, saving -always the terrible
question of slavery, which was too huge for political solution.
Of course, generosity was the best policy, an inspired policy. How better
to insure total loyalty than to do exactly what was done? The 1787 Constitu-
tion did the best a constitution could do. It may have suggested, it surely
allowed, and in no way discouraged, this astounding generosity-this suc-
cession of deeds that were both solid deeds and at the same time gestures of
fullest acceptance, of profound respect.
The American system of federalism-as to the new and old together-has
another vast advantage, an advantage that is not often given its full due,
because attention seems to be so riveted on attempts to detect some tiny
spark of life in a delusion long brain-dead.
Let us focus thankful attention on what we really have. Institutions are
never describable except by approximation, but the approximation here can
be pretty close.
First, so approximating, we really have a national government that can
deal by law with any subject which its political branches think it appropriate
to deal with on a national basis. (Here and in what next follows I put to one
side, forjust now, the very serious limits on all government contained in the
human-rights material textually in, or implied by, the Constitution.)
Secondly-and this is the unique thing that our federalism really gives
us-the states are also generally empowered. In this respect they differ from
all other subordinate governmental bodies that I know anything about. They
may deal with any subject, so long as they do not do anything, in the exercise
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of this omnicompetence, that transgresses something in national law, ex-
pressed or otherwise found.
The national omnicompetence has come about through the application-
by nearly all courts and to nearly all problems-of canons of interpretation
suitable to expounding the powers of a great nation.
But it is the state omnicompetence that is the more interesting. It has not
been reasoned about or teased so much. It rather surely comes from the
idea-dominantly a myth, since about two-thirds of the states were national
territories before they were admitted to the Union-that the states were
originally sovereign, and that they therefore had-and still have-the om-
nicompetence of sovereign states, though they cannot of course have
sovereign independence of control by national law.
So. when my old friend Bob Eckhardt was in Congress, he and I drafted a
Public Beaches Bill. Its aim was to use the federal power to slow down or
stop private appropriation of public beaches-beaches, and they were very
many over which a public easement existed, but might be extinguished by
prescription if action were not taken to end encroachment. This bill did not
win its way to committee hearing; Congress is always too busy for some-
thing, and that year Congress was too busy for that bill-and indeed for
several others we drafted. (But it was a lot of fun.)
In most if not all other countries-and I think it's probably all-that would
be the end, for now, of action to protect public beaches, unless it just so
happened that some local or administrative authority were already chartered
to deal with this rather new subject. The charter grant of the needed power
must precede local actions. It must therefore often be impossible for subor-
dinate governmental units to move without the national government's con-
sidering whether, and in what terms, it wishes to empower the local entities.
In such a case-and it is the general case-national failure to act is total
failure to act.
But with us the situation is utterly different, turned inside out. Without
any special chartering, without anyone's even thinking about the jurisdic-
tional question, Oregon, Texas, New York-all the littoral states-are com-
petent authorities as to their beaches, just as they are competent authorities
as to all other matters not forbidden them by national law.
The consequence is-and in this very field it has borne good fruit-that
these littoral states are right there to handle the public beach problem, when
the national power cannot get to it, or does not wish to get to it for now. The
time may come when this state-by-state treatment of beaches develops such
inefficiencies as to move Congress; but meanwhile Congress can consult its
own priorities in calm, knowing that the problem need not be utterly ne-
glected, as it would be neglected if there stood in readiness no second-tier
but omnicompetent authority to deal with it.
This is not a matter just of public beaches. For "public beaches" read
"virtually any problem that time can engender." This wonderful federalism
covers every subject as to which no convincing special case can be made for
a contrary provision in national law.
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This system of authority-allocation exhibits something like beauty. The
allocation is mediated by politics, and by exactly the right kind of politics.
When the need for national action is registered strongly enough, in the
national body that alone is competent to register the strength of that need,
then national action can be taken. Until that point is reached, there stand at
the ready generally empowered entities-the states-to deal with the prob-
lem.
This is genius material-a very high point in constitutionalism. The "prin-
ciples of federalism" are more often talked about as though, if they exist at
all, they must exist as fixed limits dividing state from national power. Aside
from the fact that two hundred years have not sufficed to produce the least
settling on any such limits, the projected system is hugely awkward, and if it
worked it would likely work ill. A perusal of the constitutional arithmetic of
the United States shows that, to get concurrent majorities in Senate and
House, you need a quite large consensus; on top of that, you must either get
Presidential acquiescence or truly enormous consensus in Congress. To
assert that there exist, and should be applied, some delphically preordained
rules as to "proper function" of nation or state, is to envisage the frustration
of conclusions reached at the national level by that kind of consensus-not
on the basis of convenience, nor on the basis of ethically and morally
charged human-rights material binding both state and national governments,
but of so-called "principled limits" between these two governments, having
little more shape or validation than the yearning that they may somehow,
someday, be discerned and agreed upon. To what good, I cannot imagine.
Before 1787, how many governments were there with this kind of self-
regulating division of function between the general and the local, with the
local fully empowered to take care of problems that cannot now win their
way to national attention? How many such governments are there now? I
don't believe that Britain, Germany or Italy have such a system. The
Laender and the regioni are not the same thing at all; the last thing I heard
about this in Britain was a plaint, near the verge of tears, to the effect that
regionalization of Britain was pressingly necessary, because the burden of
decision and action on the Westminster government had become unbear-
able. I question whether anything like our federalism can be improvised,
because I don't think any of those countries would go for omni-
competence-no ultra vires plea-as to local authorities. For that, you
need immemorial commitment to the myth of state sovereignty. When you
place state sovereignty face-to-face with national supremacy and national
omnicompetence, you get this marvelously self-tuning system of federalism
that we really do have. The reality is much more admirable than wistful
imaginings. And the reality makes you understand why the states, after two
hundred years of disappointment with the wistful imaginings, are still so
important. Without their omnicompetence, the whole thing might have fallen
to pieces.
I was rhapsodizing thus in class the other day, and afterwards a young
woman asked me whether maybe this whole system had not come into being
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through luck. This was a more than sensible question. I told her that of
course it did, in primal and chiefest part. The myth of state sovereignty, and,
depending on definitions, perhaps some of the reality of state sovereignty,
came into the 1787 Convention. But one of the wisest forms of planning is
not to monkey with your luck. Whether by choice or by superadded luck, the
Convention did not play around with this piece of luck. From the very
beginning they were concerned with the division of authority between nation
and state, but nobody suggested one obvious device that I believe to have
been used elsewhere-the enumeration of powers of the states. When one
gets to the subject of new states, as to which sovereignty becomes pure
myth, there is no suggestion of any wish to take advantage of this, by
drawing cautious barriers around the powers of the new states. Was this a
creative letting-be? What we have to say is that, as to doing, the 1787 people
did all they could to leave the myth alone. From then on, new generations
have done the same; even the Civil War did not stimulate any essential
change. Here as elsewhere, the Constitution is the work of the 1787 people
and of the American people since. There is plenty of credit to go around. The
1787 achievement is no less wonderful for its having been molded into reality
during the whole time of the American people.
There was a man once who said he couldn't understand why people so
admired the play Hamlet, since it was nothing but a bunch of quotations.
Our Constitution is like that.
Take the constitutency-basis of the House of Representatives. With minor
and necessary adjustments, the size of a state's congressional delegation is
proportioned to the state's population. That seems like an obvious thing to
do; even the British got around to starting toward it in 1832. But what
national government in the history of the world embodies any such idea
before 1787? This is one of those questions I used to nail on my door in the
Yale Law School, hoping to be enlightened. I'm nailing it up again, on my
Columbia office door, just as soon as I can find the Dean and get permission.
Here's another such question: Before 1787, what national government in
the history of the world put human-rights material right in its constitution, or
in some other place where it had the very same authority as did the constitu-
tive material that created the nation that was to be limited by the human-
rights material? (I keep saying "national" government because I think some
of this material was in some state constitutions before 1787-which in no
way changes that the originality was of the American people, or detracts
from the achievement of Philadelphia.)
The human-rights material in the Philadelphia Constitution was perhaps
not much. As to the national government, it protected against the gross
abuses of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, set up some safeguards
against the worst practices regarding treason, provided for jury trial in
criminal cases, partially protected the writ of habeas corpus, and started
toward religious freedom by outlawing religious tests for national office. The
government could make your life pretty miserable with no more protection
than that. But the theory was complete. The holdfast cell had gripped the
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stone. Sometimes when my eye lights on the bill of attainder passage in
article I, section 9, I get that tingling in the back of the neck; it's an apostolic
glimpse to somebody who is still working, almost in the third century, on the
very same process that started just right there.
Now let me slightly rephrase the question: In what national government,
in the history of the world before 1787, was human-rights material part of the
law that bound the regular law-giving authority, and the judicial courts?
Procedurally, this is close to the question whether any other country, before
1787, had judicial review of national legislative acts. I don't know of any.
Some people, particularly academic people, like to say that the Constitu-
tion did not provide for judicial review.
It is worth saying again and again that the Constitution, on the face of it
and in clearest text, ought to make this opinion impossible of being held, as
to review of state-law material for federal constitutionality; just call up into
your mind the supremacy clause of article VI. The teasing intellectual
puzzle, and it is a fascinating one, is how there can exist, as psychological
fact, any doubt whatever as to the legitimacy of this kind of judicial
review-by far the more important kind, by far the kind that creates the
more political turmoil. I have thought that maybe academic people dislike
having any question settled so economically and completely as this one is
settled in the supremacy clause. It doesn't leave you anything to do for the
rest of the class period; coruscating speculations are quenched ere kindled;
there is no room left for, "But couldn't you argue ... ?" and all that. More
radically, I think there are a lot of people, mostly not lawyers, but some
lawyers too, who just don't like the idea that law itself, without recourse to
any other materials than a good dictionary, can settle some questions. And
then there are the journalists, whose calling it is to look at a perfectly plain
text and ask, "Now what does that really mean?" (Don't get me wrong. I
love the press. Especially a press that won't give up until the whole sorry
story is dragged to light. Particularly these days.)
As to judicial review of Acts of Congress, the 1787 Constitution speaks of
itself as law, the kind of law that binds judges in their courts, and generates
law and equity cases. It is about equally plain, from the Constitution's own
contents, that it is set up to be a law that binds even Congress. It is certain,
from Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act and from Federalist No. 78,2 that
people in those days generally drew the conclusion so forcefully indicated.
Marbury v. Madison3 evoked protest, but on other grounds. That is why
casebook editors have had to drag out Mr. Justice Gibson's 1825 dissenting
opinion in (of all places) a Pennsylvania state case; 4 that's the earliest and
just about the only thing they have. You have to use it-even though you
have to put in a footnote that even this lonely monadnock of opinion later
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
3 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1 Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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changed his mind. How else can you get a class discussion going? Beyond
serious doubt, judicial review even of Acts of Congress was known, in and
after the Convention, to be a part of the Constitution. If I may coin an
expression, this question is, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its
interest.
What a noble creation that was! The nations of the world have thought
passing well of it; we now hear of a Corte Constituzionale, of a Verfas-
sungsgericht, even of a European Court for Human Rights. Everybody's
doing it now. But those are just quotations; Hamlet itself was brought forth
into history uniquely by the American people, politically the most gifted
people so far seen. Before you stabilize your reaction to that, think of what
happened with me and Gladstone. Think of the gathering in of land and
people by the utterly new device-new in its high ingenuity as well as in its
generosity-of modeling new states on old, and associating all indistin-
guishably in one fabric and frame. Think of the federalism wherein tasks are
divided between the whole and the parts as national need dictates from time
to time, with the assurance that no problem has to lie unattended just
because the national power is not yet interested, or is for the time being
occupied up to its capacity with other things. Think of the placing of human
rights themselves in the very Constitution, whose lawful authority is thus
limited by the law of its own being-and think of the nearly unbelievable fact
that the American people, through their national democratic branches, (and I
speak of actions, not of vain fulminations), have never even seriously tried
to break out of the authority of the courts that have interpreted and applied
this limiting law.
Well, some things went wrong in 1787. The Presidency gave the Conven-
tion buck fever-the presented problem being that of the method of choosing
the President. They marched up and down on this, and ended up with a
solution as to which a becoming reverence is hard to put on.
For some odd reason, people call it the "Electoral College," and maybe
we stand in some awe of it because of what that name suggests-an august
collegial group, collected together to canvass the names of worthies, until
shared wisdom of the major pars alights at last on one name---or, like the
College of Cardinals, balloting in a room together, until trends appear and
candidates having serious support are made known, so that future ballotings
can be sensibly directed. I don't know why people applied the phrase
"College of Electors" to the magnates who chose the Holy Roman Em-
peror. But we ought to discard the word "college," which does not occur in
our Constitution, and consider what, in that document, falls to the "elec-
tors."
The dismally anti-collegial fact is that the "electors" for each state are
bound by law to meet in that state, on the same day throughout the
Union-Georgia to New Hampshire as it was then, Maine to Hawaii as it is
now-and they are to "give their Votes" on that same day. If you have any
old sailing-packet or stage-coach time-table lying about, you will be able to
satisfy yourself that, under these strict orderings of time and place, not only
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would general and responsive discussion be impossible, but it would be
exceedingly difficult for an elector in, say, Pennsylvania to form a service-
able idea of what was likely to be happening in other states. Serious candi-
dates could not reliably be identified; this always makes sensible (as opposed
to sentimental) voting impossible. This system was sure to produce a winner
as long as George Washington was available; that it would ever do so after
then was speculative to say the very best. If a winner did not emerge from
this constitutionally ordained chaos, the election went into the House of
Representatives. But whether that House was voting on the highest five or
on the highest three, it was quite likely that the House, a majority of the
whole number of states being required for election, would itself not produce
a winner. Thus this whole system, first to last, might not even pick a
President-and you'd have to start in with the Vice-President. But the
quorum in the Senate, for choosing him, was three-fourths, even under the
twelfth amendment, while a majority of all Senators was necessary to a
choice. So here, too, there might not be a winner.
That was a nightmare. What was needed was some way of identifying in
advance a small number of serious candidates, and a limitation of the
agenda, thenceforward, to voting on those candidates. The American people
worked that out-through congressional caucus, through national parties
with their conventions, through the primaries we now have, and through a
powerful custom that the electors would ballot as they had pledged them-
selves to ballot. This set of extra-constitutional institutions has not solved
the problem perfectly, but well enough, or at least tolerably.
These days we are developing another kind of crisis as to the
Presidency-a crisis of power.
The legitimacy of any exercise of claimed inherent power by the President
is not settled in law review articles, or by the esteem these severally may
enjoy. The substantive law on this is "secreted in the interstices of [a]
procedure."' The constitutional procedure is very heavily tilted in the Presi-
dent's favor-so much so that the futility of following it to the end may (and
often does) cause congressional opponents of the President, like
chessplayers, to resign early from a game the unfavorable end of which is
clearly seen. Let's look at this procedure in all its stages, though we know
the whole road may not be followed every time.
The first person to decide whether the President has power to take some
action is the President. If Congress disapproves, the only action of which
Congress is constitutionally-which is to say procedurally-capable is the
passage of a bill or resolution purporting to condemn, disaffirm, or nullify the
action, and perhaps to prohibit it in the future. This measure, under the very
clear terms of article I, section 7, must be presented to the President for his
signature. In the nature of the case, he will veto it. Override will require a
two-thirds vote in each House-a forbiddingly difficult thing to attain, where
5 H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883).
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the President has done something that is supported by a good many people in
the country or in Congress, though not by a majority in either. There the
game ends.
An ever-growing substantive power of the Presidency is absolutely fated
to be secreted in the interstices of this procedure, unless something can be
done.
I have an idea as to what could be done. I have no illusions that accep-
tance of my idea is likely right now. But things may get a lot worse, and
action of some kind may come to strike more and more people as necessary.
If some action is not resolved upon, then the President is always going to be
able to do pretty much what he wants to do, as long as he is supported by
only one-third-plus-one of only one House, and never mind about the other
House. Thirty-four Senators, who (in the limiting case of a smooth con-
tinuum) could represent states containing some five percent of the national
population, can prevent override.
Let me put the matter not as a proposal but as a hope. I hope that
someday, perhaps after one more administration of disastrous excess, many
Senators and Representatives may begin to feel that the fated aggrandize-
ment of the Presidency-through the operation of the procedure I have just
outlined-bodes worse evil to the country than could any occasional loss on
any one substantive issue.
If that ever comes about then-without any constitutional 'change-the
way out of this Catch-22 could be opened, through the formation of a
consensus, or convention, to the effect that certain kinds of presidential
vetoes are to be overridden. Such a convention might conceivably grow up,
for example, around presidential acts of war. As now, Congress might
simply pass a bill or resolution, dealing negatively with the presidential act.
The President would veto. Then, if the new convention prevailed, an over-
ride could easily be arranged, usually by the members who do not want to
vote for override absenting themselves.
Now you say that's impossible, that such a convention could never form.
You may be right. But if you're right we must face up to a very considerable
paradox. In the War Powers Joint Resolution of 1973,6 both Houses of
Congress voted by overwhelming majorities for a provision that would
produce just exactly the same result as would be produced by the convention
or consensus I have suggested. According to the Joint Resolutions, the
Houses of Congress were to be able to pull the President out of a warlike
situation by passing a concurrent resolution, not subject to veto. I repeat,
that is exactly the situation which we would be in if a convention were to
take shape and prevail in Congress that presidential vetoes of congressional
measures directing an end to warlike actions ought always to be overridden.
That part of the War Powers Resolution pretty clearly set up an uncon-
stitutional procedure. In any case, the War Powers Resolution has proven to
be a disappointment-most fundamentally, I think, because it attempted too
6 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
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much and too exact definition, thus making it easy for a President to sidestep
it-for it to become his perch and not his terror. But it remains true that the
Houses of Congress of that day voted, by overwhelming majorities, to take
certain measures out of the veto power. How can you be so sure that things
will not get bad enough for Congress to form a similar judgment, and to
implement it this time in a constitutionally impeccable way? (Consider, too,
that any Senator or Congressman, however he voted on the original vote,
might think it most unwise for the country to be committed to a warlike
action that has been disapproved by majorities in both Houses, and so might
vote for override.)
Such a convention of automatic override would give Congress enormously
greater flexibility than did the 1973 War Powers Resolution. First in impor-
tance here is that Congress would devise its own definitions and from time to
time make its own decisions as to when these definitions were applicable,
instead of being inevitably trapped in a pattern of mere response to the
President's decisions on these points. This convention, moreover, could be
cautiously extended, as Congress and not the President saw fit. For exam-
ple, Congress might extend it to vetoes of legislation forbidding in advance
warlike actions the President was planning or was suspected of planning. Or
to the veto of bills revoking or narrowing earlier delegation of some power to
the President, or to any part of the executive branch.
You may say that the President, as he is acting under a claim of constitu-
tional power, might simply disregard any congressional actions of the sort I
am talking about. Well, for a while maybe, and in some cases. But acting in
clear defiance of a command of Congress, his own veto having been overrid-
den, is something I doubt a President would want to keep doing, or do often.
For one thing, the mist around the concept of "impeachable offenses" might
seem to clear up a little when a serious warning has been given, in the
constitutional forms. For another, whatever immunities the President may
be thought to have from civil liabilities, it is unlikely that all his subordinates
could successfully rely on the excuse that they were "acting according to
orders" that were issued in defiance of a duly enacted law.
This may be a less than inspirational note on which to end. We do still get
buck fever about the Presidency. But it may in the long run turn out to be
one of the greatest excellences of our Constitution that it puts in the hands of
Congress, once Congress is sufficiently aroused, the means of saving us from
any excess of executive power.
Did the people of 1787 anticipate this? Well, it is very plain that they did
not anticipate anything like such free-wheeling use of the veto as has devel-
oped. Maybe they would not be displeased to find that Congress as an
institution can have the final power in the government, when enough of its
members have the necessary will. However that may be, their very text
makes this possible.
In any event, let us not forget that so eminent a person as Gladstone
thought that the 1787 Constitution was "the most wonderful work ever
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struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." ' 7 That work is
ours to use. All it could do, as to some of our problems today, was to clear a
path. But what a path it cleared!
7 Gladstone, supra note 1, at 185.
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